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Abstract 
The protests that engulfed South African universities in 2015 and 2016 revealed a dissatisfaction 
by students with regard to higher education fees. This article looks at some of the lessons that could 
assist South Africa in understanding the role of universal fee‑free higher education or fee‑free higher 
education for the poor. Most countries in the post‑colonial global South indicate a shift to cost‑sharing 
as mounting financial pressures on state budgets make universal free education unsustainable. The 
current study shows that the cost‑sharing model in South Africa has not resonated with students and 
may also be exclusionary to poor students. The lessons from the post‑colonial global South show that 
the trend in higher education is that the poor are often left out of most fee structures – including dual 
track, universal fee‑free, and cost‑sharing models. The current study explores some implications and 
considerations of the current means test model that has been introduced by the current South African 
president, while using the global South as reference point for the implications of this fee structure, 
particularly in relation to poor and working‑class students. 
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Introduction 
South Africa’s achievement of a democratic dispensation in 1994 meant all South Africans 
could have equal participation in the country’s governance choice and saw the doors of all 
higher education institutions being opened for everyone, regardless of race or gender. By 
the time South Africa had to some extent freed itself from the subjugation of the minority 
population, most African countries had achieved independence from colonial rule, and 
had begun engaging with the difficult questions of nation building, and higher education 
became a focal point of how to achieve this.
Towards the end of 2015, the South African university landscape saw a number of 
student‑led protests that demanded fee‑free higher education (Mbembe, 2016; Pillay, 2015). 
However, it is worth noting that the demands made by students were not limited to 
fee‑free education as there was a resurgence in the demand for a decolonised higher 
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education system (Mbembe, 2016; Pillay, 2015). The movement that would come to be 
known as #FeesMustFall (#FMF) effectively used social media to galvanise support and 
was intertwined with #RhodesMustFall (University of Cape Town), #OpenStellenbosch 
(Stellenbosch University), Black Student Movement ([University Currently Known as] 
Rhodes University) and a host of other movements through which students’ sought to 
transform particularly historically white institutions (Hodes, 2016). 
The #FMF student movement showed some variation with regard to what fee‑free 
education would entail in the South African higher education sector. In this regard, 
institutions such as the University of Johannesburg (UJ), University of Pretoria (UP), 
Durban University of Technology (DUT), University of the Western Cape (UWC), 
and Cape Peninsula University of Technology (CPUT) all called for free education 
(Moosa, 2016). The University of the Witwatersrand (Wits) students called for universal 
free education, while at the (University Currently Known as) Rhodes University students 
called for free education for the poor and the “missing middle”, i.e. those students whose 
parents earn a combined family income of R123 000 up to R600 000 (Moosa,  2016). 
In general, the students appeared to have made the decision that fee‑free higher education is 
an important aspect of higher education provision that is fair and equitable (Naicker, 2016).
The #FMF movement’s demands of fee‑free education were not met by then 
president Jacob Zuma as he only conceded to a 0% fee hike for the 2016 academic 
year (Naicker, 2016). He established the Fees Commission under the auspices of the 
Department of Justice (DoJ) in January of 2016 to investigate how higher education could 
be funded going forward (DoJ, 2016). The commission was set to conclude its work in 
eight months; however, by the time the second round of protests began in 2016, it was 
largely on the basis that universities were set to increase fees in the 2017 academic year, 
and the commission had not concluded its work (Department of Higher Education and 
Training [DHET], 2016). The state announced through the Minister of Higher Education 
and Training that there would be no fee increase for those whose families have a combined 
income of R122 000 and below, while those identified as the “missing middle” would also 
not incur a fee increase as the state would cover the shortfall (DHET, 2016). 
The demands made by students reflect democratic South Africa’s struggle to alleviate 
poverty and create an environment conducive to sustainable development. For the majority 
of the country’s population, obtaining a university degree does not only mean better 
job opportunities but also a drastic shift in social mobility for an entire generation. The 
importance of an educated society cannot be overstated, particularly in South Africa with 
its recent history of subjugation and intentional underdevelopment of the large majority 
of the people. According to Albach, Reisberg and Rumbley (2009), higher education has 
been recognised globally as a means for people to access higher‑paying work, and as an 
important economic driver. Additionally, Bloom, Canning and Chan (2006) have argued 
that investing in higher education for any society has a direct impact on economic growth 
(see also Kapur, & Crowley, 2008). 
The Fees Commission released an interim report towards the full report in 2017, 
after handing the report to the president. The Fees Commission had a number of 
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recommendations, most notably that students from poor and working‑class families be 
given Income Contingent Loans through private banks that would be guaranteed by 
the state (DoJ, 2017). The Presidency announced that in the university sector poor and 
working‑class students would be considered as families with an annual combined income 
of R350 000 and below, and these students would therefore receive fully subsidised higher 
education including accommodation, study material and transport costs, while those who 
are above this new threshold up to R600 000 would incur no fee increase as the state would 
again, for the academic year 2018, provide for payment of the shortfall (The Presidency, 
2017). This is a fundamental change in the higher education landscape and surely meets the 
demands made by students from the 2015 and 2016 protests. 
This article deals with the issue of free education and how this may have an impact 
on the structure of higher education and, by extension, society, with regard to the class 
distributions. The focus is on what lessons can be learnt from other post‑colonial countries. 
Given the legacy of apartheid and colonialism in South Africa it is imperative that we 
ask: How does South Africa reshape the higher education landscape to be more inclusive 
of both class and race? Are there lessons to be learnt from other post‑colonial countries? 
Does fee‑free higher education allow greater access for the poor and working classes or is 
the trend towards higher education to remain the privilege of the middle to upper classes? 
These are important questions to ask in an attempt to democratise higher education and 
include those who are often left in the margins of a modernising society.
The South African Condition
Due to South Africa’ s racialised past, it is important to keep in mind the role that class 
plays in racial disparities and the role that race plays in creating class disparities (Young 
& Braziel, 2006). Mbeki and Mbeki (2015) highlight that there is a growing class issue, 
particularly between those at the top of the economic strata and those at the bottom, that 
may not necessarily be race based. It is, however, still the case that class cannot be spoken 
about without speaking about race.
South Africa is rated amongst the most unequal societies out of 120 countries in the 
world using the Gini Coefficient1 (The World Bank, 2017). Mbeki and Mbeki  (2016) 
demonstrate that a large proportion of South Africa’s population lives in dire poverty. 
Estimated at 23.6  million people, they have termed this category the “underclass”. They 
note that the underclass is largely occupied by black people, while the white population 
group lives mostly in the middle and upper economic strata, though the top one percent 
of South African society is mixed in terms of racial demographics (Mbeki & Mbeki, 2016). 
These numbers are not new in the South African public domain as the former president 
of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, argued in what has come to be known as the ‘Two Worlds’ 
speech (Mbeki, 1998). Amongst the things the former president was referring to was the 
South African economic divide which was (is) based on race, with the white minority 
1 Measures relative wealth in society (see The World Bank, 2017). This was rated at 0.69 in 2014 and may 
continue to rise if we consider that the unemployment rate has increased to 27.1% (StatsSA, 2017).
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having the lion’s share of the country’s wealth, while the black majority live in dire poverty 
(Mbeki,  1998). This assertion was not without dispute as Nattrass and Seekings (2001) 
proposed that the South African socioeconomic landscape was not highly skewed in favour 
of the white minority. However, the position of this article is such that the inequalities of 
South African society have persisted well into the 24‑year‑old democracy and are very 
evident even in higher education.
According to the DHET (2015), in 2013 the African population group made up 68% 
of all students registered in contact universities; however, the DHET does not make a 
case for the socioeconomic status of the African students. This leaves the question of the 
socioeconomic background of the students being unknown or, worse yet, the unverified 
assumption is that a large proportion of these students come from low socioeconomic 
backgrounds. The conflation of socioeconomic status and race often leads to false 
conclusions about the class struggle in South African society. Amongst these is the idea that 
a much greater number of the people on the lower end of the socioeconomic strata are 
gaining access to the higher education system, particularly university education, than may 
be the case. 
The 2016 General Household Survey (Statistics South Africa [StatsSA], 2017, p. 17) 
indicated that the participation rates in higher education amongst African and coloured 
population groups (aged 18 to 29 years) were the lowest with 3.3% and 3.5% respectively, 
compared to the participation rates of Indian (18.8%) and white (17.5%) population groups. 
The low participation rates of African and coloured population groups are concerning 
as these groups are most affected by poverty and deprivation (StatsSA, 2012; Mbeki & 
Mbeki, 2016). Although the African population groups may have the highest numbers with 
regard to people within the higher education sector, this appears to be a disproportionate 
representation. Additionally, while the evidence presented by StatsSA (2017) offers much 
about race participation, the question of class remains unanswered. 
A recent study conducted at a historically white university (HWU) on factors 
affecting academic performance included an array of factors such as race, class, age, gender, 
previous type of high school, social capital, locus of control, well‑being, international status, 
language, and frequency of lecture attendance, noted an interesting trend between race 
and class (Dlamini, 2016). The research did not intend to highlight participation with 
regard to race and class. However, many of the participants indicated that they came from 
homes that fall within the middle to upper strata of South African society with regard to 
family income and the type of high school they had attended, which were mostly former 
Model  C and private schools (Dlamini, 2016). If we consider the results of DHET (2015) 
and the study by Letseka, Breier and Visser (2010), the African population group makes 
up a larger proportion of the students enrolled in the university system (66.4%),  although 
they constitute the smallest relative to the population size (StatsSA, 2017, p. 16).  There thus 
appears to be a disproportionate participation rate with regard to the economic class within 
the sector. 
To fund students coming from lower‑income homes, the state created the National 
Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS) (NSFAS Act No. 56, 1999). NSFAS is a loan that is provided 
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to students who come from households where the combined family income is less than 
R122 000 per year. The final year of the loan can be converted into a bursary provided 
the student finishes their degree in the requisite time; however, the rest must be paid back 
to the state (DHET, 2015). The increase in the student numbers in the early years of the 
millennium saw NSFAS come under pressure to fund more students. However, the NSFAS 
budget has increased substantially between the time the scheme was introduced in 1999 and 
the 2015 academic year, from a budget of R441 million in 1999 to R9  billion in the 2015 
academic year (NSFAS, 2015). The 2014/2015 NSFAS  report (2015) indicates that the 
government scheme had funded 42% of students in the higher education system, though 
this number was inclusive of students in Technical and  Vocational Education Training 
(TVET) colleges and could be significantly lower if only universities are considered. 
According to the Centre for Higher Education (CHE, 2016), in  2011, NSFAS funded 
31% of students, and 24% of the students in the year 2013 in the country’s universities. The 
authors can only speculate that the marked decrease can be attributed to the increase in the 
university fees and an increase of the student numbers – although the effect of the latter can 
be considered to be minimal. 
The recent announcement by the Presidency on the structure of university fees 
included a restructuring of NSFAS. The Presidency outlined that all students currently 
registered at a university and whose fees are being paid for through NSFAS will be 
given grants rather than the current loan system (The Presidency, 2017). In line with this 
announcement is that education will be fee‑free for those at TVET colleges, while those 
who are classified as working class or poor will also not pay for university education. 
What remains to be seen is the effects this will have for students who are accessing higher 
education for the first time starting in 2018, that is to say whether class disparities will be 
alleviated within the higher education sector. 
The protests that engulfed the South African higher education sector in 2015 and 
continued, to an extent, in 2016, indicated that students were unhappy with the state 
funding in higher education (Naicker, 2016; Hodes, 2016; Motlalepule & Smith, 2017). 
They also indicated that even though NSFAS has had a fundamental role in allowing those 
who were previously marginalised to attend higher education institutions, and particularly 
universities, students still felt that there was more that could be done, as evidenced by the 
protests in 2015 and 2016. The issue of the majority of African students’ participation in 
the higher education sector has been a point of focus because of the country’s history of 
racial division which resulted in the majority of the country’s population being left out 
of the formal economy (Seedat, 1998; Mbeki, 1998). It is important to note that in as 
much as university participation is a matter of redressing the injustices of the past that have 
left a legacy of a racialised economy (Mbeki, 1998) and higher education sector, issues 
of class participation need careful monitoring as they may create two worlds in South 
African society. 
Further, South African democracy is fairly young if looked at in terms of participation 
for all who live in it, and the current article posits that there are valuable lessons that can be 
learnt from other post‑colonial countries that have grappled with the issue of an inclusive 
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economy. Failures and successes in this regard offer an important way to shape the higher 
education sector, particularly with the demands for free universal or free education for the 
poor – that are made by students in universities (Moosa, 2016).  These lessons can offer a way 
to understand some of the implications that such a system can have in the higher education 
sector, particularly for the millions of South Africans living in poverty, and whose hopes for 
a better future rest with the children who may have access to a university education.
Post‑colonial Trends in Higher Education
Universal fee‑free education
The issue of access to higher institutions of learning for the poor in the post‑colonial world 
is one that has become a point of contention. Bloom et al. (2006) argue that there is a clear 
link between a country’s economic development and a well‑functioning higher education 
sector. Mamdani (2008) argues that higher education is an important sector as it is where 
teachers are trained, where curricula are developed, and where the leaders of a society are 
cultivated. For instance, the colonial period did not yield the number of graduates required 
for the newly independent countries to be able to function at optimal level (Mamdani, 2008; 
Teferra & Albach, 2004). As such, the post‑colonies carry the enormous challenge to reverse 
the effects of colonisation and offer people in those countries opportunities for a better life. 
Cloete (2015) makes the point that “free higher education sounds revolutionary … 
but in a developing country it is financially, empirically and morally wrong” (p. 11). This 
argument is based on the idea that in a post‑colonial country such as South Africa, the 
rich are often the beneficiaries of a universally free higher education system. This article 
postulates that the current fee‑based higher education system is not only benefiting the 
upper class and the middle class, but a higher education system that is universally fee‑free 
will only serve to entrench this further. As Cloete (2015) puts it “for the rich, higher 
education in South Africa is a bargain, for the gifted poor it is affordable through financial 
aid …” (p. 11). 
Oketch (2003) argues that the calls for tuition‑free higher education in countries 
such as Kenya, Uganda and Zambia were based on the notion that tuition is prohibitive to 
those who cannot afford higher education, which led to protests by students in the 1990s 
for higher education to be tuition free. South Africa has had to deal with the same kind 
of protests in 2015; as noted earlier, students have made similar arguments with regard 
to fee‑free higher education in South Africa (Moosa, 2016). The idea that the current 
model is exclusionary has taken hold in South Africa and, as demonstrated by the results 
of Dlamini (2016) at a HWU, this may well be true. However, it does not appear that a 
tuition‑free higher education system will have the benefits of equality that the students are 
seeking (Oketch, 2003). 
The benefits of a fee‑free education may not accrue to the poor and working class 
as can be seen in the case of Brazil, which has universal free education for its student 
population (Brotman & Pollack, 2017; Johnstone, 2004). However, this has not lead to 
equitable participation of the classes in higher education. Kapur and Crowley (2008) 
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indicate that in Brazil 65% of the students attended private basic education and a more 
indicative statistic is that 66% of the student population come from the top 20% of the 
socioeconomic strata. This indicates that a universally fee‑free education serves to benefit 
those who come from the upper economic strata of society, and who then have the upper 
hand in entering higher education. In this way public universities become a space to 
reproduce privilege by giving access to the valuable resource of university degrees to those 
who already occupy a privileged position in society. 
Cost‑sharing
According to Johnstone (2004), a number of countries have introduced some kind of 
cost‑sharing that is “a shift of the higher educational cost burden from exclusive or near‑
exclusive reliance on government, or taxpayers, to some financial reliance upon parents 
and/or students …” (pp. 403‑404). Mamdani (2008) notes that it was The World Bank 
that urged the post‑colonial countries, particularly those in Africa, to move towards a 
cost‑sharing model as higher education was seen as a private good in comparison to basic 
education which was seen as a public good (see also Oketch, 2003). The private versus 
public good debate is a problematic one as the distinction is arbitrary and seeks to create 
a binary where none exists. This is to say that there is both a private and public good in 
higher education as the individual who gains a university degree is able to access higher 
paying jobs, resulting in taxes from which the public also benefits. 
In other post‑colonial countries such as Uganda and Tanzania the cost‑sharing model 
that has been used is the dual‑track system, which means having fee‑free institutions 
and having privately sponsored students (Ishengoma, 2004; Marcucci, Johnstone & 
Ngolovoi, 2008). Marcucci et al. (2008) argue that even though there is a dual‑track system 
in these countries, there is still unequal access to higher education, particularly because of 
the stringent access requirements. As is the case in Brazil, most students who attend the 
universities in East Africa – which includes countries such as Kenya – come from private 
schools, while families who cannot afford a private education have no option but to place 
their children in dysfunctional public schools and, as a result, access has been in favour 
of those in the upper strata of the socioeconomic ladder (see Kapur & Crowley,  2008; 
Marcucci et al., 2008). What this highlights is a concern that even though higher education 
is fee‑free for the majority of students, because the public basic education system in those 
countries does not ensure student success in entering higher education, the result has been 
that those who can afford the fees for private basic education are still populating the higher 
education space (Kapur & Crowley, 2008; Marcucci et al., 2008). 
Further, according to Kapur and Crowley (2008), in Asian countries such as China 
and India where university education is state funded, there is heavy regulation that seeks to 
limit the expenditure on universities. However, the imposed regulations have also had an 
effect on the quality of education provided and decreasing academic freedom. Institutional 
autonomy is a vital part of many academic institutions that operate at optimal level around 
the world. In South Africa, the state has allowed institutions autonomy to choose their 
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pedagogical and research direction, and even set the fee scale according to the needs of 
each institution (CHE, 2016). What is concerning, however, are the disruptions in keeping 
the higher education sector financially viable, which often have negative consequences for 
achieving these research objectives as seen in places such as Uganda (see Mamdani, 2008; 
Bloom & Canning, 2006). The reduction of research outputs from sub‑Saharan Africa 
– with the exception of South Africa – and the rest of the developing world is of particular 
concern, and the government of South Africa, along with the higher education sector as a 
whole, recognises this component.
Most post‑colonial countries have faced the challenge of being unable to achieve 
the desired goal of equitable access through cost‑sharing methods. Rather cost‑sharing 
appeared to entrench the inequalities, with a further effect on teaching and learning 
within higher education institutions (Mamdani, 2008). The same can be seen in the cost‑
sharing method that South Africa was using up until 2017 as it was not achieving the 
goal of class access and, to an extent, the goal of racial demographic access (StatsSA, 2017; 
Dlamini,  2016). Although cost‑sharing appears to make a case for the fact that higher 
education is both a public and private good, what this kind of structure fails to recognise 
is the problematic manner in which cost‑sharing often excludes those who cannot afford 
university fees. In South Africa, it must be said, NSFAS, has to some degree been able to 
mitigate this. However, other challenges faced by students who come from working‑class 
and poor families, including transportation, food and accommodation, have resulted in 
a high dropout rate amongst these students. Intergenerational poverty often results in 
students having to leave, particularly contact universities, so that they may be able to provide 
financial support to families. Cost‑sharing appears on the face of it to allow equal access for 
everyone in a society; however, the result is often that there is an undue burden placed on 
individual families whose circumstances are affected by the history of the systematic racism 
of apartheid and colonialism. 
The call for free education by South African students can be seen as a move in the 
opposite direction of most African countries. While other countries are looking at cost‑
sharing, South African students are calling for fee‑free education. South Africa, upon 
achieving democracy in 1994, had already had a cost‑sharing method whereby the 
government subsidised students but students in higher education were (are) required to 
pay a fee. The South African government’s current role is mainly in issuing what is known 
as ‘block grant’ funding that differentiates teaching input (enrolments), teaching output 
(graduation rates), research output (advanced postgraduate research degree graduates, 
and publications by staff and students) and lastly institutional factors (based on size 
and proportion of students from historically disadvantaged populations) and so‑called 
‘earmarked’ funds (CHE, 2016). It can be argued that the South African government views 
the higher education system as both a private and public good, through which cost‑sharing 
mechanisms have been maintained. 
Following the protests in 2015, the then Minister of Higher Education and Training in 
South Africa, Blade Nzimande, maintained that the state was “committed to progressively 
realise free post‑school education for the poor and the working class … and to assist 
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middle‑class families who are unable to pay” (DHET, 2016, p.  1). It appears that the state 
at this point was leaning towards a system in which the poor and the working class could 
have fee‑free education while the middle and upper class would engage in some kind of 
cost‑sharing. The announcement by the Presidency in December of 2017 was in line with 
the commitment made by the minister two years prior, as higher education will be free for 
those coming from poor and working‑class backgrounds, while those who come from the 
middle to upper classes will contribute in a cost‑sharing method (The Presidency, 2017). 
Future Considerations for South Africa
The current analysis of some of the trends in the global South indicates what Cloete (2015) 
points to about universal fee‑free education being more beneficial to the economic elite 
than it is to the poor and the working class. However, the trends also indicate that cost‑
sharing mechanisms are not the solution that they may appear to serve, specifically to the 
poor and working class, as cost‑sharing often means that the individual student must be 
in an economic position to pay for fees. It is clear that the introduction of fee‑free higher 
education in South Africa must be carefully monitored in order to ensure that there is 
an increase in the number of students from poor and working‑class families who access 
university education.
The introduction of a holistic funding system can serve as a deterrent for the high 
attrition rates amongst working‑class and poor students. It is important to note here 
what Oketch (2003) argues about students in countries such as Zambia, Uganda and 
Kenya who tend to stay longer in the education system when a holistic funding system is 
introduced. The issues of throughput are well documented in South Africa as being a result 
of a multitude of factors acting against students who come from working‑class and poor 
families. Some of these include student well‑being (Young & Campbell, 2014), institutional 
culture (Matthews, 2015) and even first‑generation status (Hlatshwayo, 2016), which all 
intersect to produce low throughput rates. 
The issue of attrition, however, serves as a vital point when holistic support is 
considered with studies showing that students either do not finish their degrees in the 
required time frame or drop out completely, leaving university without acquiring even the 
basic degree (Letseka et al., 2010). It is in issues of attrition and throughput that studies 
investigating the reasons for this high attrition rate should become an imperative for the 
sector with regard to funding, as they can better illuminate the challenges faced by students. 
It is worth noting, however, that existing literature in this field, such as the landmark study 
by Letseka et al. (2010), shows that those students who come from poor and working‑class 
families are the hardest impacted by attrition rates for a variety of reasons such as those that 
were investigated by Dlamini (2016). 
Given that the financial constraints can be mitigated by means of fee‑free education, what 
still bears mentioning here are the effects of the basic education system on access and success. 
Even though students from working‑class families can apply for a state grant and not pay 
fees for university in other post‑colonial countries such as Brazil and Uganda, students 
who come from private basic education still are the beneficiaries (Kapur & Crowley, 2008; 
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Oketch, 2003). The difference in South Africa is that fee‑free higher education is based on 
a means test; however, this does not mean that those from the lower economic strata are 
going to populate universities, as one of the most important requirements is still grade 12 
results. It  is in this way highly important that the inequalities in the quality of basic 
education are fast eradicated to ensure that the inequalities in higher education are not 
further entrenched. 
At this point in the country’s policy development, it has become necessary that research 
focusing on attrition and throughput influences the direction that the higher education 
system takes. Mamdani (2008) notes that higher education is a great public good when it 
is applied in this way. Stated differently, higher education is not just a place where people 
can gain skills that ensure social mobility, but the research that is produced in academic 
spaces can and should influence the country’s policy in some form. It is worth repeating 
that the climate in which students do not complete their degrees on time will put a heavy 
burden on an already overly extended fiscus, in which the state has other competing 
social problems such as the social grants that are now being provided to over 17  million 
people. South Africa’s slow economic growth and low employment rate can result in the 
inability of the state to shoulder financial responsibility for the higher education sector. 
This conundrum is seen in other post‑colonial countries, as noted by Oketch (2003) and 
Johnstone (2004), and may very well become a South African reality.  Mayanja  (1998) 
argues that the state should remain the primary funder of the higher education system 
in Uganda. However, there should be increased sensitivity to equality, with an element of 
positive discrimination. For South Africa it is important that we take cognisance of the 
concerns raised by Mamdani (2008), Johnstone (2004) and Kapur and Crowley  (2008) 
about post‑colonial states’ capacity to maintain the costs of higher education. 
Another alternative to consider in the future should South Africa not be able to maintain 
free education is what has been implemented in Scotland – although not necessarily a 
former colony. The country has done away with upfront fees to higher education and 
instead has introduced the Scottish Endowment Fund, wherein former students contribute 
in the form of taxes to the sustainability of the system (Johnstone,  2004).  There are 
concerns with this as it puts an increased burden on the young black graduate who often 
has to pay the current income‑based tax and living expenses while supporting unemployed 
(and underemployed) family members (Mbeki & Mbeki, 2016). This has been a criticism 
with regard to NSFAS repayment, which takes into consideration affordability but is often 
an expense that such a graduate cannot afford in real terms. For this reason – and also lack 
of employment opportunities – NSFAS repayment has been rather slow (NSFAS, 2015). 
Conclusions
South Africa is in a unique position in that it can learn from other post‑colonial countries 
with regard to what to do with the resource of higher education. The developmental 
agenda that South Africa is currently engaged in does not exclude an effective higher 
education system. There are matters that appear to have more pressing urgency than that of 
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higher education, and this is not unique to South Africa (see Johnstone, 2004; Kajubi, 1992; 
Mamdani, 2008; Oketch, 2003). 
This article has focused on whether there could be lessons learnt from other 
post‑colonial countries on the issue of fees in higher education. The trend in the global 
South has been to move from no fees to some fees being charged for obtaining a higher 
education qualification; this has been largely due to constraints on financial resources 
(Kapur & Crowley; Oketch, 2003; Kajubi, 1992; Mayanja, 1998). Equality with regard to 
socioeconomic class has appeared an elusive concept in higher education institutions in 
the post‑colony, and in South Africa the conflation of race and class has also proven to 
make this goal even more difficult to attain. It is important that we highlight the racial 
disparities in higher education if we are to properly redress the challenges currently facing 
the country. However, in so doing, we cannot create a classist society. 
The ‘Two Worlds’ that former president Thabo Mbeki spoke about will be maintained 
if  the country does not take into consideration issues of positive discrimination with 
regard to not only race but also class. The understanding that higher education offers an 
opportunity for class mobility in a world where knowledge and skills are increasingly 
valuable should be paramount in the analysis of higher education (Johnstone, 2004;  Teferra 
& Albach, 2004).
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